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—ITHE PROBLEM
Considerable attention has been given in recent literature to the
problem of forecasting the main components of national income,
especially the level of savings at full employment in an early post-
transitional year such as 1950. Almost invariably the method
consists in projecting the relations between national income or
gross national product and its components observed in the decades
of the 'twenties and 'thirties (or only in. 1929—40) to the much
higher level of income expected for the post-transitional period.
The aim of this paper is to show that because of the violent cyclical
fluctuations that characterized the period of observation the
results tend to be systematically biased. Some criticism on this
score has already been voiced by other authors,1 but no systematic
•attempt has apparently been made to formulate it precisely, to
test its validity, and to indicate its quantitative implications for
purposes of estimation and of forecasting.
'We shall examine several relations among economic variables,
show that there is evidence of a pronounced discrepancy between
•the cyclical, or short-run, and the secular, or long-run, form of
these relations, and suggest methods of analysis by which it seems
•possible to estimate both. Although the results are tentative and
leave many questions unanswered, it is hoped that the broad lines
of approach suggested will be of some use in improving the relia-
bility of our long-range as well as short-run forecasts.2
IIRECENT ESTIMATES OF THECONSUMPTIONFUNCTION
Starting with the crucial question of forecasting savings from
disposable income, a procedure for which several methods have
1See, forexample, Hart, 'Model Building and Fiscal Policy', American Economic
Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Sept. 1945), especially pp. 533—6; Cohn Clark 'Postwar
Savings in the U. S. A.', Institute of Statistics, Oxford, Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 6
and 7 (May 19, 1945), pp. 97ff. A. H. Hansen gives an illuminating discussion of
this problem in his Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (Norton, 1941), Ch. 11.
2Thisstudy was completed before the publication of the revised estimates of
national income and its components by the Department of Commerce in August
1947 ('National Income', Survey of Current Business, Supplement, July 1947).
No attempt has been made to revise the quantitative results obtained for the
United States, because the new estimates do not go sufficiently far back to allow
for a satisfactory test of the hypothesis advanced in this paper. The implications
of the revised estimates are commented upon in the Section XIV.
We merely point out here that although the revisions would affect some of the
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been employed, we consider briefly those suggested by Mosak,
Woytinsky, and especially
Mosak's method is most open to criticism. It consists in using
the relation between consumption expenditure and disposable
income in current prices observed during 1929—40 as a first ap-
proximation to the consumption function of the American econ-
omy.4 Applying this relation to his forecast of disposable income
in 1950, which, assuming 1940 rates of taxation, would amount to
about 154 billion current dollars, Mosak obtains an estimate of
individual savings of nearly $22 billion, some 14 percent of dis-
posable income.
This approach has been severely criticized by Woytinsky who
points out the logical difficulties involved in extrapolating a rela-
tion between undeflated dollar series. More generally, the relation
between undeflated dollar series tends to be systematically biased,
especially when the time series are for a period characterized by
cyclical fluctuations as violent as those of 1929—40. Theoretical
considerations as well as statistical evidence indicate that there is
a marked tendency for prices to fluctuate together with physical
quantities during a cycle. The cyclical covariation of prices in
turn tends to cause a marked positive correlation between the
dollar series, even if the 'true' relation between the series in real
terms is slight or negative.
Hence, the relation between series in current prices, even if more
pronounced than that between the corresponding deflated series
(as it often is) is an unreliable tool of analysis; extrapolation of
such a relation implies, among other things, extrapolating the
cyclical relation between movements of real income and prices,
a particularly unjustified procedure in long-range forecasting.
specific quantitative estimates given below for the United States, they do not in
any way invalidate the substance of the argument.
J. L. Mosak, 'Forecasting Postwar Demands: Ill', Econometrica, Vol. 13, No. 1
(Jan. 1945), pp. 25—53; W. S. Woytinsky, 'Relationship Between Consumers'
Expenditures, Savings, and Disposable Income', Review of Economic ,Statistics,
Vol. 28, No. 21 (Feb. 1946), pp. 1—12; Arthur Smithies, 'Forecasting Postwar
Demaiid: I', Econometrica, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan. 1945), pp. 1—14.
Mosak's paper indicates that he was aware of the oversimplification involved iii
his approach but felt that it would not affect his results unduly.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 373
These remarks explain in part why Mosak's formula leads to
untenable results when applied to estimates of disposable income
and consumption for the years immediately preceding World
War I, when prices were disproportionately lower than income as
compared with 1929—40. Thus, for 1913 when, according to the
latest estimates of the Department of Commerce, disposable in-
come amounted to about $33 billion and savings to $3 billion,
Mosak's formula gives a level of savings of —$2billion! If this
formula fails so completely when extrapolated oniy fifteen years
back to a much lower level of income, we cannot put much confi-
dence in the results of extrapolating it ten years forward to a
much higher level.5
None of the objections leveled against Mosak's type of approach
can be raised against the extrapolation of the equation used by
Smithies:
II 1 C =76.58+ .76Y + 1.15(t —1922).
C denotes real consumption, V real income per capita (both in
1929 dollars), and t time. In the first place, Smithies' equation is
based on the relation between deflated series (the deflator being
the cost of living index), and in the second, the period of observa-
tion includes the seven relatively stable years 1923—29.
Despite these differences in approach, when Smithies' formula
is applied to forecasting the level of individual savings at full
employment in 1950, the results are strikingly similar to Mosak's.
•Thus, for a disposable income of $154 billion in 1943 prices (cor-
•responding to Smithies' assumption C with respect to the tax
structure) he, too, estimates savings to be $21—22 billion, some
14 percent of disposable income.
These results deserve closer examination. Smithies' equation
not only gives a very close fit for the period of observation, but
also, contrary to Mosak's, appears to explain satisfactorily the
•Note that the relations between 1913 and the period of observation, on the one
hand, and that between 1950 and the period of observation, on the other, are
•similar in many respects. Both years are separated from the period of observation
by a.major war with a marked price rise. the level of income that may be
expected to prevail in 1950 at full employment is likely to be nearly as much above
the average income for the period of observation as the income prevailing in 1913
is below it.374 PART V
relation between income and consumption prevailing in earlier
decades. In Smithies'.own words, "applying the above formula to
changes in Kuznets' national income figures we obtain a close
approximation to changes in his consumption figures".6 This, in
turn, raises an interesting question. As is well known, Kuznets'
estimates indicate that the ratio of consumption to net national
product has remained remarkably stable in the five decades 1879—
88 to 1919—28, fluctuating between a minimum of 88 and a
maximum of 89.2 percent, and showed no tendency to fall with
the secular increase in income. Similarly, according to the De-
partment of Commerce estimates, the average ratio of consumers'
expenditures to disposable income in 1923—40 amounted to about
91 percent and remained consistently above 88 percent (except
in 1923 when it was 87.4 percent). If Smithies' formula satisfac-
torily explains the relation between income and consumption
prevailing in this period, why does application of the same formula,
when extrapolated to 1950, yield a consumption-income ratio of
only 86 percent?
To answer this question we must note that, according to
Smithies' equation, the consumption-income ratio depends upon
the rate at which income grows. From this equation we can, in
fact, derive the following:
II 2
=(76.6+ 1.1st')+ .76; (t' denotes t —1922)
ITt
EquationII 2 shows that the ratiowilltend to rise, fall, or
remain constant depending upon whether the fraction on the
right side tends to rise, fall, or remain constant; and this, in turn,
obviously depends upon the relation between the coefficient of t
6Smithies,op. cit., p. 6. Kuznets' figures are those given in his of National
Income in Peace and War', National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional
Paper 6, March 1942, P. 31, Table 2, and p. 3, Table 6. These estimates were
somewhat revised in Kuznets' later study, National Income: A Summary of
Findings (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946). Since this book was not
published until after our study had been completed, the discussion in the rest of
this section is based on the earlier estimates referred to by Smithies. Certain
implications of the new estimates are, however, discussed in note 10.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 375
and the actual rate of growth of income in time. In particular, the




that is, if Y grows at the specific rate given by the formula:
76.6 1.15t' 112a + o—.76
Inthe five decades covered by Kuznets, the consumption-in-
come ratio fluctuated around• .89. If we substitute this figure for
in formula II 2a, the coefficient of t is approximately 8.8. In
other words, it appears that if income per capita is growing in the
long run at the average rate of about $8.8 per year, then, and only
then, will the consumption-income ratio computed from Smithies'
equation tend to fluctuate around a constant long-run level of
.89. The average growth of income per head in Kuzuets' estimates
happens to be precisely $8.5 per year. This, then, explains why
Smithies' formula seems consistent with the constancy of the
saving-income ratio exhibited by Kuznets' estimates. On the
other hand, according to Smithies' forecast, disposable income at
full employment in 1950 would amount to $1,060—i ,070 per capita
in 1929 prices, while the corresponding figure in 1940 was oniy
$675. His forecast therefore implies an increase in real income per
capita of nearly $40 per year from 1940 to 1950. With such an
unprecedented rate of growth, Smithies' formula naturally leads
to a saving-income ratio 20 to 30 percent higher than that implicit
in Kuznets' historical estimates, and 40 and 60 percent higher
than the ratio of saving to disposable income in the 'twenties and
'thirties, as estimated by the Department of Commerce.
We do not intend to discuss here whether the optimism of
Smithies and of many other investigators in forecasting such a
stupendous growth in the years to come is at all justified.7 The
71t is true that by 1941 income per capita had already risen to about $775. Still,
Smithies' forecast would imply an annual increase from 1941 to 1950 of some
$30 per head. Inasmuch as in 1941 we were very close to full employment, this rise
in income would have to be brought about almost exclusively by increases in376 PART V
question that interests us here is whether, assuming the correct-
ness of this forecast, we can put much confidence in the projec-
tion of Smithies' formula to a period when income is assumed to
be rising at a rate about eight times as high as during the period
of observation, and five times as high as during the period covered
by Kuznets' data, to which this formula was applied. In other
words, is the rise in the saving-income ratio (the fall in the con-
sumption-income ratio) that follows from Smithies' formula for
periods of rapid rise in income acceptable in the light of statis-
tical experience?
Table 1 contains a partial answer. Although Smithies' formula
gives a surprisingly good approximation to the actual total change
in savings over the period as a whole, it fails rather badly in each
subperiod in which the growth of income was markedly diferent
from the critical rate of $8.8 per year- (col. 4). The reason is not
hard to find. As we have just seen, according to Smithies', formula
the consumption-income ratio depends upon the rate at which
income grows. Kuznets' estimates, on the other hand, show that
the fluctuations in this ratio were not only very small but were
essentially unrelated to the rate of growth of income. It must be
noted in particular that in the last decade covered by Table 1,
when per capita income rose at an annual rate of $16, or twice as
high as the critical rate, Smithies' formula is biased distinctly
upward, indicating an increase in savings 26 percent larger than
the actual increase. How then can we apply this formula with
confidence to a period in which income is supposed to grow at an
even faster rate?
Since the publication of Smithies' paper, the Department of
Commerce has made available revised estimates of disposable
income and consumption for 1919_288. If Smithies' method is
applied to these revised data, the results are:
II 3 C= 71.7+ 78Y + .83(t —1922)
productivity. (AlsoSmithies'forecast of disposable income includes a small
amount of nonproduced income or net transfer payments; these, however, repre-
sent less than 2 percent of disposable income.)
These estimates are reproduced in the Appendix Table, columns (1) and (2).FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 377
TABLE 1
Changes in Kuznets' Estimates of Savings compared with Changes com-




























































of National Income in Peace and War', National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Occasional Paper 6, 1942, p. 31, Table 2, col. 2. Kuznets uses the term 'net
capital formation' rather than 'savings'.
b The figures in thi8 column were computed as follows: Kuznets' net naUonal
product (ibid., col. 1) was deflated by using the price index implicit in his con-
version of consumer outlay to 1929 prices (p. 35, Table 6), and divided by the
average population for each decade (Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1944—45,p.8). Substituting the resulting real income per capita series in Smithies'
equation and giving to £ the value corresponding to the middle of each decade, we
obtain a series of computed changes in real consumption per capita.
At this point there were two possible lines of procedure. We could subtract
KuznetB' changes in real consumption and Smithies' changes in real consumption
Ifrom Kuznets' changes in real income, thereby obtaining a true and 'computed'
series of changes in real savings per capita. This comparison, not given in the
table since we are more interested in comparing changes in aggregate savings in
current dollars than changes in real savings per capita, shows percentages of error
considerably greater than those in the table, ranging from a maximum of 150
percent for the first period to a minimum of 21 and 18 percent for the third and
fourth periods, respectively, and amounting to 73 percent for the last period.
The other possible procedure—the one followed—was to transform the series of
'computed' changes in 'real consumption per capita' into a series of 'computed'
real consumption per capita, adjusting the constant term in Smithies'
so that actual and computed series would agree in the last decade. This series was
then èonverted into aggregate consumption at current prices by multiplying it by
the price index and average decade population. Subtracting this series from
Kuznets' series of net national product in current prices we obtain 'computed'
average yearly savings in current prices for each decade. From this series we
computed changes in savings (coL 3).
The multiple correlation coefficient, though somewhat lower than
that originally obtained by Smithies, remains very high,
What is significant, however, is the sizable fall in the coef-
Smithies has informed us that the correct figure should be .996, rather than .97
as given in op. cit., p. 6, note 2.378 PARTY
ficient of time—from 1.15to.83. The new time trend of consump-
tion is no longer in line with the rate of growth of Kuznets'
national income; the new equation therefore gives a distinctly
worse approximation even for the aggregate change in savings
from the first to the last decade.'°
To conclude: although Smithies' hypothesis is theoretically
consistent, his contention that it explains past developments
satisfactorily is not fully warranted. In fact, if we accept Smithies'
hypothesis that consumption depends essentially on current in-
come, plus a trend factor entirely independent of income, we must
accept also the hypothesis that the apparent long-run stability
of the saving-income ratio is essentially due to chance, that is,
to the coincidence of the time trend of income with the 'independ-
ent' time trend of consumption. The latter hypothesis, however,
is obviously not very satisfactory and, furthermore, does not
stand up well under closer examination of the data.
This criticism leads us to formulate a counter-hypothesis: (a)
the apparent long-run stability of the saving-income ratio in
the course of the gradual secular expansion of income is not due to
chance, but rather to a structural property of the system, a con-
sistent phenomenon that can be extrapolated; (b) the tendency
for saving to fluctuate together with and proportionately more
than income, which according to the available evidence has been
very pronounced in the interwar decades, is a cyclical phenom-
enon.
The hypothesis that the relation between savings, consumption,
and income might be influenced by cyclical conditions has already
been advanced by other authors and has recently been tested by
Woytinsky. His approach, however, is not very convincing inas-
much as he segregated 1931—34 from 1923—40, and fitted separate
equations to 1931—34 and to the remaining years (1923—30 and
'°Kuznets'revised estimates in National Income: A Summary of Findings imply
an upward revision of the ratio of net capital formation to income up to the dec-
ade 1914—23 (p. 53, Table 16). While we did not recompute our Table 1 on the
basis of the revised estimates (given in full in Kuznets' National Income since
1869, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), there is reason to believe
that Smithies' equation, especially after the revision of the time trend indicated
in the text, would significantly underestimate savings in the early decades.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 379
1935-40). This procedure seems to us too arbitrary and we see
no reason therefore to place much confidence in the extrapolation
of the various regression equations Woytinsky obtained for the
'more or less prosperous years' which indicate that the saving-
income ratio tends to fall as income rises. The distinction between
prosperity and depression is obviously quantitative, not qualita-
tive, and can therefore be measured. This idea will be developed
in the next section as we proceed to formulate our hypothesis
more precisely, to demonstrate that it can be tested statistically,
and to show that there is support for it.
III AN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS TESTED FOR THE
UNITED STATES
First we formulate operational definitions of what we mean by
'cyclical' and 'secular' changes in income. By the secular move-
ment of income we mean a movement that carries real income per
capita above the highest level reached in any preceding year; by
cyclical movement we mean any movement, whether upward or
downward, that leaves real income per capita below the highest
previous peak." These definitions may be conveniently given in
symbolic terms. Letdenote real income per capita in the year
t anddenote the highest real income per capita realized in
any year preceding t; the change in income between the year t
and the year (t + 1) will be called cyclical, if both and
+1 < = otherwise, it will be called secular. The
quantity willbe referred to as the 'cyclical income index'.
In terms of the above definitions and symbols, the hypothesis
we offer states that the proportion of income saved will be posi-
tively related to, and largely explained by, the cyclical income
index.
In Chart 1 the saving-income ratio is plotted against the cyclical
income index for the twenty years 1921—40, both quantities corn-
Thisis in accordance with Marshall's use of 'secular', since an expansion in
income above the highest previous peak must, in general, be due to the gradual














Relation the Saving—Income Ratio and
the Cyclical Income Index;v;)
Untted States, 1921 —1940
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0
—.45 —.40 —.35 —.30 —.25 —.20 —.15 —.10
CyciLcalincome index
0 +.05+.10
puted from the latest Department of Commerce estimates.12
Evidently, between the two variables there is. a marked direct
12 For sources and methods of computation for these series, see Appendix refer-
ences A and B.
Saving—Lncome ratio
.13
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relation which appears to be essentially linear. The coefficient
of correlation is .84, definitely significant in view of the relatively




According to this equation, if income were secularly constant
savings would be about 10 percent of income, but if income rose
rpercentabove or fell rpercentbelow the previous peak, the
ratio would change .125 (.01) r. (For instance, with a secular
growth of 5 percent, the ratio would amount to approximately
percent, while with a cyclical fall of 30 percent, it would
amount to only about 6 percent.)
Our correlation coefficient cannot be compared directly with
that obtained on Smithies' hypothesis, since the latter relates
consumption toincome, while in our equation it is the consump-
tion-income ratio that is explained. To make a comparison, we
must restate our hypothesis in terms similar to those of Smithies;
this can be done by multiplying both sides of the equation III 1
III 2 k — b
This hypothesis can be tested by correlating consumption with
and In making this test we shall also be answering one
"The analysis in the text refers exclusively to 1921—40, though the Department
of Commerce has prepared estimates of disposable income and consumption as far
back as 1909. It is, however, generally conceded that the margin of error in the
estimates of savings for theperiodbefore 1919 is sufficiently wide to make the
inclusion of these years inadvisable. Their inclusion would, we believe, reduce
rather than increase the reliability of the regression equation for purposes of
extrapolation. For the sake of comparison, we might add that with the inclusion
of 1910—14 the correlation coefficient falls somewhat—from .84 to .77—and the
regression equation changes only slightly:
=.094+ —
Finally, if we extrapolate our equation III 1 back to 1910-14 we get, in all cases,
a distinctly better approximation to the Department of Coranierce estimates of
consumption than by extrapolating Smithies' equation II 3. Both equations un
derestimate the consumption-income ratio; in equation III 1, the underestimate
ranges from zero to 3 percent.382. . .
important objection that can be raised against our initial ap-
proach: namely, that by using the saving—income ratio instead of
saving itself as. a dependent variable we are assuming a priori
and without test that consumption is an homogeneous function
of the independent variables. This assumption, however, should
be tested by carrying out the correlation indicated by equation
III 2, then examining whether the constant term in the resulting
equation is sufficiently small to be consistent with the hypothesis
that its true value is approximately zero. If we make the correla-
tion the regression equation is:
III 3 2(±32)+
The corresponding multiple correlation coefficient is prac-
tically the same as the coefficient, .993, obtained by applying
Smithies' hypothesis to the revised Department of Commerce
estimates for Furthermore, the constant term in equa-
tion III 3 is evidently quite small and is statistically insignificant,
being only a small fraction of its standard error, 32.
This last result is of particular interest from our point of view.
The equa•tions obtained by Mosak and Smithies (and by most
other investigators as well) contain relatively large positive con-
stants, implying that the marginal propensity to consume is less
than the average and that changes in income tend to produce
14•Thesimple and partial correlation coefficients are =.988; =.15;
=.07; =.992;and =.54.The partial correlation is not very
high; nevertheless, in view of the large number of observations, it is statistically
significant; in fact, by the usual test, its level of significance lies between 1 and 2
percent. Furthermore, the partial correlations are distinctly larger than the cor-
responding simple ones. Also, for the revised Smithies' equation, II 3, the partial
correlation is also. only .59. If we use the ratio of the mean square successive
difference to the variance of the residuals (hereinafter referred to as K) to test
the randomness of the residuals in time, we get a value of 2.51. On a 5 percent level
of significance, this value of K is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
residuals are random. It is in this sense that we refer to K as insignificant in the
discussion that follows. (See B. I. Hart and John von Neuman, 'Tabulation of the
Probabilities for the Ratio of the Mean Square Successive Difference to the Vari-
ance', Annals of Mathematicai Statistics, Vol. 13, pp. 207—14.) The appropriateness
and efficiency of this test for our purpose is open to considerable doubt. None-
theless, it appears to be as good a test as is available.
The addition of the years 1921 and 1922 to the period originally used by
Smithies (1923—40) raises Smithies' multiple correlation from .991 to .993.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 383
less than proportional changes in consumption. On this basis both
authors are led to conclude that the saving—income ratio is bound
to increase whenever income rises (Mosak) or at least, whenever
real income tends to rise at a sufficiently high average annual
rate (Smithies).
Our results indicate instead that we must distinguish between
(a) the short-run or cyclical marginal propensity to save, and
(b) the long-run average and marginal propensity.
a) As long as income rises secularly, Yg andwill rise together.
Therefore, the saving—income ratio will depend not on income, but
essentially on the rate of change in income. This can best be seen
if we rewrite equation III 3 using the identity & = — Ct:
=—2+ + —
Since the constant term is entirely negligible in comparison with
the relevant values of Y, saving tends to represent approximately
•10 percent of income plus some 12 percent of the increment of
income. Because of the last term, the proportion of income saved
•will tend to vary somewhat in years of secular expansion, increas-
ing as the rate of change in income accelerates.16 But since the nor-
mal secular growth is in the order of 2 to 3 percent, we may con-
clude that the saving—income ratio will tend to fluctuate around
a level of about percent. This figure clearly measures also the
proportion of any secular increment in income that will tend to
be saved in the long run (that is, the long-run marginal propensity
tosave).
b) In the case of cyclical fluctuations in income, on the other
Sucha lag seems to explain, for instance, the high saving-income ratio for
1923 and 1929. It undoubtedly explains also, at least in part, the exceptionally
high saving-income ratio for 1941, when, according to the Department of Com-
merce estimates, real income per capita increased 15 percent—three to four times
more than the largest annual growth in the entire period of observation. If we
extrapolate our equation to this year, we obtain a saving-income ratio that is
higher than in any other year but still falls considerably short of the Department
of Commerce figure, 15.9 percent. It is not unlikely that for exceptionally high
secular rates of increase above the highest previous peak, the lag of consumption
may be more pronounced (and possibly last longer) than indicated by our equa-
tion; this point will be briefly considered later. Extrapolation of Smithies' equa-
tion also fails to explain the behavior of consumption in 1941, since it gives the
very same figure as our equations III 1 and 3.384 PARTV
hand, is fixed by definition. Hence, the relation between
saving and income takes the form:=— (2+ +
The cyclical marginal propensity to save is given by the
coefficient ofor .23, as compared with the secular marginal
propensity of .10 to .11. Also, on account of the constant term, the
saving—income ratio tends .to fluctuate with income during each
cycle, falling below the secular level as income declines and rising
toward it again as income increases.17,
IV. THE COMMON SENSE OF THE HYPOTHESIS
Is our hypothesis based on, or at least consistent with, realistic
assumptions concerning economic behavior? Clearly, the confi-
dence we can place in our results depends largely on the answer.
Our long-run hypothesis may at first appear entirely unrealistic.
Casual Observation, fully confirmed by all budget studies, reveals
that the rich save more than the poor. However,' both everyday
experience and budget data relate to the behavior of different
people at the same point of time, whereas our hypothesis con-
cerns the behavior of aggregates in time. There is strong reason
to suppose that as aggregate income increases, persons moving
into progressively higher income brackets do not tend to acquire
the saving habits characteristic of persons formerly in the income
bracket; on the, contrary, they may tend to save less. Indeed, it
can easily be demonstrated that the hypothesis that they save as
much would lead to rather absurd results.18 Our tentative con-
17Ourconclusions must, of course, be qualified to the degree that our estimates
of the regression coefficients, especially that of aresubject to error. What has
been said, however, will help to make clear the full implications of our hypothesis
and statistical results.
18Allbudget studies consistently show that the lowest group of income re-
ceivers as a whole to dissave a more or less substantial proportion of its in-
come. Now, let us consider the 'break-even' income in the latest available budget
study; then as we move back in time to lower and lower levels of aggregate income,
we must expect to find a gradual increase in the proportion of income receivers who
got less than this 'break-even' income. We should therefore be led to conclude that
the proportion of income receivers who dissaved would also grow larger and larger
as we move further back in time, a conclusion that can certainly not be considered
very realistic. (The alternative would be to make even less realistic assumptions
concerning changes in income distribution.)FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 385
clusion is, in fact, supported by a careful analysis of American
budget material carried out by Dorothy S. Brady and Rose D.
The reason persons in each income bracket tend to
save less as aggregate income rises secularly, and the plausibility
of our long-run hypothesis become apparent when one considers
the nature of economic progress. Economic expansion is not
•characterized by the availability of increasing quantities of the
same commodities, but rather by the continuous improvement of
•many old commodities and by the continuous appearance of
entirely new ones. If consumers had no choice except to spend
their increasing income on more and more of the very same com-
modities, then indeed it would not be surprising to find at least
some relative increase in saving as income rises. Actually the
increment in income accruing to each group of income receivers
tends to be absorbed by the new commodities that gradually
become available. If we compare the consumption of a family
with a certain income in 1940 with that of a family with the same
(real) income in 1870, we would expect to find that the additional
spending of the 1940 family was absorbed by the purchase of
commodities that did not exist in the earlier period. Thus, the
hypothesis that the saving—income ratio tends to be relatively
independent of the secular expansion of income (that is, in com-
parison with its cyclical behavior) is not unrealistic and also is
not inconsistent with, but is supported by, budget data.
With respect to our cyclical hypothesis, there are numerous
supporting factors. We confine ourselves here to considering
briefly the three that seem to be quantitatively most important:
(a) cyclical changes in the income distribution, (b) rigidity of ac-
quired consumption habits, and (c) fluctuations in the level of
unemployment.
a) There is some evidence that, at least for higher income brackets,
the distribution of income tends to become less unequal as income
contracts, and tends to resume its initial shape as income recovers.
Though the quantitative importance of this phenomenon 'has not
been firmly established, it is well known that agricultural income
19See'Savings and Income Distribution', Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume
Ten.a
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andprofits in general tend to fluctuate proportionately more than
other incomes during a cycle ;20 and there is good reason to sup-
pose, that profit earners or entrepreneurs, especially farm fami-
lies, have, on the whole, a greater than average propensity. to
save.2' We have, therefore, grounds for expecting that a cyclical
fall in income will tend to be accompanied by a redistribution of
income from groups having a greater propensity to save to groups
with a smaller propensity to save, while a cyclical rise in income
will have the opposite effect.22
b) A marked fall in income below an accustomed level, such as
occurs during a cycle, creates strong pressure on acquired con-
sumption habits. This pressure tends to be met by partly main-
taining at the expense of saving. That is, savings
tend to bear the brunt of a cyclical change in income, falling
proportionately more than consumption and income as income
declines. Similarly, as income moves back toward the initial level,
there is pressure to restore the initial relation between incQme and
saving. In other words, the saving-income relation tends to re-
trace the same cyclical path in the opposite direction, saving rising
relatively faster than consumption as income increases.23
It may be objected that if income remains below the highest
previous level for a considerable time, there must be a tendency
for consumers to become fuiiy adjusted to the lower level by re-
arranging their expenditure pattern without waiting for income to
recover. However, in the there is no evidence
of such an adjustment. In any case, such an adjustment is likely
to be much less important than niay appear at first glance, es-
20 The proposition concerning the cyclical of aggregate profits is tested
in Section VIII.
21Withregard to farm families, see Brady and Friedman, bc. cit.
22Fora further theoretical discussion of this point, see, for instance, Michael
Kalecki, Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuatidns (Farrar & Rinehart, 1939),
pp. 42—74, especially p. 65, and pp. 116—49. Note that in his 'trendless economy'
fluctuations in income coincide with what we have defined as cyclical fluctuations
in income.
23Thisfactor was especially stressed by James Duesenberry in a paper pre-
sënted at a meeting of the Econometric Society in Atlantic City, N. J., in January
1947. Mr. Duesenberry independently developed and tested a hypothesis very
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pecially in an expanding economy. First, income receivers are
inclined to look upon a fall in income as temporary and therefore
be less willing to make any further painful adjustments. Second,
the individual does not consciously pattern his consumption
habits on the period when his income was highest. Again, the
point is that the secular expansion of income brings with it a
continuous change in the types of commodities available and in
the structure of expenditures. These commodities, as well as the
habits of using them, obviously cannot disappear even when in-
come falls to, or below, some previous level at which they did not
exist. Finally, the quantitative importance of a gradual adjust-
ment is further minimized by a third feature that characterizes the
cycle.
c) As is well known, cyclical fluctuations in income are much
more the result of changes in unemployment than of changes in
the income of the employed.24 The cyclical income index may
therefore be expected to move in close harmony with the ratio
of the unemployed to the total labor force. Now, if there is a long-
run tendency for employed persons to consume a constant
tion of their income, any substantial fluctuation in the level of
employment will cause consumption to fluctuate proportionately
less than income, since though the unemployed produce no in-
come, they necessarily maintain at least part of their consump-
tion.25 In other words, the level of savings corresponding to any
given level of income tends to be lower (that is, the level of con-
sumption tends to be higher), the greater the unemployment,
since the savings of the employed are partly offset by the dis-
savings of the unemployed.
The above arguments explain why savings tend to fluctuate
proportionately more than income as long as income fluctuates
below its previous peak. But the same sort of consideration also
Iexplainswhy a similar relation holds when the cyclical income
After the contraction of 1929, for instance, per capita income did not recover
until 1940, but per capita income of employed persons had virtually recovered by
1935.
25Thisis not strictly true for. disposable income, which includes transfer pay-
ments to the unemployed. See, further, Section V in which a statistical attempt to
measure the influence of the specific factor of unemployment is discussed.388 PART V
index is positive. As explained above, when this index is positive,
it measures essentially the rate of growth in income, and if this
rate is much higher than the normal secular rate determined by
the rate of technological progress, the saving-income ratio too
must tend to rise above its normal secular level. First, if the
growth is larger than can be accounted for by technological prog-
ress, it must tend to be. accompanied by a further fall in unemploy-
ment. Second, such a development is likely to be accompanied by
features characteristic of boom years, such as abnormally high
profits and raw material prices. Finally, our hypothesis states
that eventually consumption will rise in proportion to income, but
this adjustment may easily occur with some lag. It is theoretically
conceivable that the relation between the saving-income ratio
and the cyclical income index may not be the same,quantitatively
when the latter is positive and when it is negative. From the few
observations at our disposal we cannot estimate separate rela-
tions, although there is some indication that the line of relation
may be somewhat steeper for positive than for negative values
of the cyclical income index.26
V AT REFINEMENTS
Since the characteristic cyclical-secular pattern of saving is due
to the joint action of several factors, should we not introduce these
factors directly into the analysis instead of measuring them in-.
directly through the cyclical incQme index? There is no denying
that the approach presented so far is greatly oversimplified. On
the basis of theoretical considerations, one should introduce not
only the specific factors mentioned in the preceding section but
also other factors, some of general significance (for example,
fluctuations in instalment credit, capital gains and losses, per-
manency of the highest previous income level), and some of special
26Onthis point see also note 16. The relation may not be linear. The difficulty
of estimation is increased by the fact that the variance of the positive values of
the cyclical income index must, because of its nature, be relatively small. Whereas
there are nopriori limits to the negative values of the cyclical income index
(since current income may theoretically fall to zero) the possibility of increases
above the previous peak is generally limited by technological conditions.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 389
significance for the United States in the period under considera-
tion (for example, changes in income taxation and in the volume
of transfer payments).
Any attempt to refine our approach, however, meets serious
difficulties. For one thing, no estimates are available for some of
the theoretically relevant variables; and those that are available
are so crude as to make their value dubious for the purpose of
refining the approach. Moreover, it is doubtful that the present
estimates of consumption and saving are sufficiently accurate to
justify a more refined approach involving a large number of
independent variables, especially when we consider that the
simple correlation between consumption and income is already in
the order of .99. The most important consideration, however, is
more technical. As we have argued, all the factors of greatest
quantitative importance have a strong cyclical character and are
highly intercorrelated among themselves and with the cyclical
income index. Hence, even if we had the necessary statistical in-
formation, any attempt to measure the separate influence of each
factor would lead at best to highly uncertain estimates. These
a priori considerations are fully confirmed by certain attempts in
this direction made during the course of this study.
One such attempt, which aimed at measuring the separate in-
Ifluenceof unemployment, may be briefly described here both as an
illustration of this point and for its intrinsic interest.
Total consumption may be considered to be made up of the
consumption of the employed and of the unemployed. The first
quantity (denoted below by CE)mayagain be assumed to depend
on the current and on the highest previous income: using E for
the number employed, 1 for the aggregate income they earn (net
of personal taxes), andfor the highest previous income per
employed person, we have:
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will become possible to refine the analysis.28 All we can say with
relative confidence at present is that the joint effect of the various
factors was to produce a cyclical marginal propensity to consume
in the order of 75 percent as compared with a long-run average
and marginal propensity of 89 to 90 percent.
The failure to reach reliable quantitative conclusions for the
individual factors is probably not as serious as might appear. As
we have argued, the intercorrelation between the theoretically
relevant independent variables is a systematic phenomenon that
may be expected to hold in the future. If so, the determination of
the separate influence of each variable, though undoubtedly of
theoretical interest, is not of crucial importance for forecasting.
Pending further refinements, it appears that our simplified ap-
proach, despite its theoretical crudeness, may be extrapolated
with relative confidence. These conclusions are fully supported
by an analysis of Canadian and Swedish material.
VI THE HYPOTHESIS TESTED FOR SWEDEN AND CANADA
The consumption-income relation in Canada for 1923—39 is
shown in Chart 2.29 Owing to the nature of the original estimates,
the two series differ considerably from those used for the United
States, not only in reliability but also in concept. The series
graphed on the horizontal axis is deflated gross national product;
the consumption estimate graphed. on the vertical axis includes
government expenditure but excludes expenditure on consumer
durables except motor cars, for which a crude adjustment was
28Onefactor of special importance is instalment credit because it tends to off-
set, to some extent, the action of the three factors discussed in Section IV. As a
result of the decline in the expenditure on durable goods as income falls cyclically,
new instalment borrowing tends to decline, falling short of repayments on out-
standing loans, which depend on purchases contracted for earlier. This tends to
maintain saving as income declines. The opposite movement occurs when income
is recovering, the increase in saving being partly offset by an increase in net in-
stalment borrowing. Unfortunately, no adjustment could be made for this factor
because good estimates of instalment credit are unavailable for the period before
1929. For if one subtracts from aggregate savings the net yearly change in
instalment credit, the scatter of Chart 1 improves considerably.
29Forthe sources and derivation of the series on which Chart 2 is based, see Ap-
pendix reference C.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO
made. (Estimates of net national product seem somewhat less
reliable than thOse of gross national product.) For lack of a better
CHART 2
Relation between Consumption and Gross National Product
Canada, 1923 — 1939.
(BLilions of 1929 dollars)
deflator, the cost of living index was used to deflate both series.
Obviously the two series thus obtained are theoretically not en-
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It must, of course, be recognized that this brief analysis of
Canadian experience is necessarily rather crude and that the
quantitative results are tentative. In particular, the exceptionally
marked lag of consumption behind income deserves further in-
vestigation. However, even our crude analysis shows rather con-
vincingly that the discrepancy between the cyclical and secular
relation of income and consumption is at least as pronounced in
Canada as in the United States.
The data for the United States and Canada analyzed so far
cover a period that is relatively short and entirely dominated by
the cycle of the 'thirties. It is important to test our hypothesis
over a longer interval. Probably the only country for which this
can be done at present is Sweden, for which continuous estimates
of national income and consumption are available from 1896 to
1934, though, again, they are conceptually somewhat different
from those used for the United States.32 These estimates, adjusted
for changes in prices and population, are plotted in scatter diagram
form in Chart 3 (omitting the war years 1914—18). The relation
between the two variables appears to follow the pattern indicated
by our hypothesis: when income falls below the previous peak
there is a. distinct tendency for consumption not to retrace the
secular path, but to remain at a higher level, fluctuating about a
line markedly less steep than the secular line. Indeed, the hypo-
thesis of equation III 2 appears to fit the data remarkably well,
as indicated by a multiple correlation coefficient of .997 and sig-
nificant partial correlations, for all The regression
equation is:
VI 2 =61+ — — =61+ +
32Themajor conceptual difference is that the Swedish estimates include taxes and
corporate savings in income, and government expenditures on goods and services
in consumption. For sources and methods used in computing these series, see Ap-
pendix reference D. Estimates are available for 1935—39 also, but are not truly
comparable with earlier years.
The simple and partial correlation coefficients are:
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS PARTIAL CORRELATIONS
r0y =.985 =.996
=— .26 =— .88
=— .1
The value of K is 1.54, which is not significant (see note 14).FLUCTUATION IN THESAVING—INCOMERATIO
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From this equation it appears that the long-run marginal propen-
sity to consume is in the order of .85 or slightly less, depending on
the secular growth of income, while the short-run marginal pro-
pensity is only The fact that the cyclical marginal propensity
appears to be so much lower for Sweden than for the United States
probably reflects the influence, in the course of the cycle, of cor-
If we assume the normal secular growth of income to be some 2 percent per year
(approximately the average growth in the past) we can replaceby .98Y, ob-
taining:=61+ .50 + .98(.35)=61+ This equation may be con-
sidered the long-run consumption function and is graphed as a solid line in Chart
3. It indicates a long-run marginal propensity to consume of about .84.
Relation between Income and Consumption
Sweden, 1896—1934 (1914-18 omitted)
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nod may be explained approximately as well on Smithies' hypothe-
sis as on our own. For the period of observation, the two hypothe-
ses are equally tenable. But the difference between them becomes
quite significant when one tries to ,make a long-range forecast for
1950. According to Smithies' hypothesis, the gradual upward drift
in the short-run consumption-income schedule would depend on
the passage of time alone and is therefore entirely unrelated to the
growth of income; the relative stability of the saving—income ratio
in the past reflects merely a coincidence between the trend of con-
sumption and of income.But, according to our hypothesis, this
gradual upward drift is directly related to the growth of income
(through the factor it is not a mere coincidence but a sys-
tematic phenomenon that can be extrapolated.
The difference between the level of income prevailing in 1940
and the level that may be expected in 1950 at full employment is
so large that the relation between Smithies' consumption trend and
the secular rate of growth in income no longer holds. On the basis
of Smithies' hypothesis we are therefore led to expect a much
higher saying-income ratio than was ever realized in the period of
observation. On the basis of our hypothesis the. saving7income ra-
tio in 1950 would not' depend directly on the level of income but
only on the cyclical position of that year. Assuming full employ-
ment and a normal rate of growth of income (let us say, 2 to 4
percent), equation III 2 or 3 would lead us to expect a saving-
income ratio of 10 to percent.39 When disposable income is
$154 billion, this implies a savings level of $16—17 billion; the fore-
cast was $21—22 billion, or about 14 percent, according to Smithies
and Mosak, and $10—li billion, or. about 7 percent, according to
HAccordingto equation III 3, the saving-income ratio will not be entirely inde-




Hererdenotesthe assumed rate of growth of income. The value of the last term
in the right side of the equation obviously depends on the assumed level of real
income,However, since real income per capita was nearly'$700 in 1940, the
value of this term is, in any event, extremely small. Different assumptions about
Y, (as long as'they remain within realistic limit8) will not affect 'the foreôast of
the saving-income ratio significantly.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—iNCOME RATIO 401
One other approach to the problem of forecasting—
that of V. Lewis Bassie, which appeared too late for us to compare
his results thoroughly with ours—leads to estimates close to those
of Smithies and Mosak.4' But our examination of Bassie's method
gives us no reason to modify our conclusions.
According to the latest estimates of the Department of Com-
merce, in the first quarter 011946 disposable income and savings
were running at a seasonally adjusted rate of some $140 billion
and $19 billion, respectively,42 indicating that the saving-income
ratio had already fallen from the wartime peak of over 28 percent
(reached in 1944) to percent. On the basis of our results a
further significant decline may be expected by 1950. This decline
will not necessarily proceed without interruption since in the first
transitional and post-transitional years the relation between in-
come and consumption is and will be affected by several excep-
tional circumstances, tending to produce opposite results, any of
which may dominate temporarily. For example, shortages of corn-
40Woytinaky'sequations are extrapolated as follows: A disposable income of $154
billionin 1943 prices corresponds to about $130 billion in 1941 prices. Substituting
this figure in the two equations considered most reliable by Woytinsky (op. cit.,
equations 11 and 21a), we obtain $11 billion and $9.5 billion for savings.
41'Consumers'Expenditures in War and Transition', Review of Economic Statistics,
Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug. 1946), pp. 117—30. Bassie's hypothesis yields the somewhat odd
result that real consumption per capita depends not only on real income per capita
but also on the size of the population. It is true that his equation fits the data
remarkably well. But the income and consumption series he used are old Depart-
meat of Commerce estimates, which differ from the current ones, especially for the
prewar period. For the period after 1921, the difference between Bassie's and
Smithies' hypothesis is not as great as may appear. The short-run marginal pro-
pensity to consume is again about .77, while the linear trend is replaced by the
gradual increase in population.
The above consideration shows that in Bassie's, just as in Smithies' hypothesis,
the upward drift of the consumption schedule is independent of the rate of in-
crease in income. Hence, if we extrapolate Bassie's equation into a period in which
income is expected to rise considerably faster than in the past, relative to popula-
tion, we again get a distinctly higher saving-income ratio than in the period of
observation. We are not in a position to compare directly Bassie's forecast of the
saving-income ratio with the other forecasts discussed here, since Bassie's results
are not given explicitly except in graphic form. If we use our standard test assump-
tion of $154 billion at 1943 prices, Bassie's equation yields a saving-income ratio of
about 13.5 percent.
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that they will be closely related to the size of the money income
flow.
These theoretical considerations suggest that Mosak's equations
can express oniy cyclical, not secular, relations; this is entirely con-
firmed by a statistical check. If his equations are extrapolated only
as far back as the years immediately preceding World War I, they
fail to given even a remote approximation to the behavior of prof-
its. For example, in 1915, according to the Department of Com-
merce, corporate profits amounted to about $3 billion and total
entrepreneurial income to $11 billion, while, according to Mosak's
formulas, corporate profits should have amounted to —$3.2billion
and total profits to $1.9
The fallacy of Mosak's procedure is obvious in Charts 4 and 5•48
If we neglect the exceptionally high profits of World War I years
(1917—19), which are omitted in the graphs, we have two types
of line: a relative flat line going through 1909—13, the decade of
the 'twenties (excluding 1921), and 1940; and several steeper cy-
clical lines, such as those through 1913—16, 1920—22, and 1929-40.
Mosak's regression line is essentially the steep cyclical line cor-
responding to 1929—40. The reason for the large discrepancy be-
tween the actual level, of profits 'in 1915 and the level computed
from his equation is clear. It is equally clear why he was led to
forecast so high a level of profits for 1950. According to his fore-
cast, corporate profits in 1950 at full employment would constitute
some 16 percent of income, although the highest ratio in the inter-
war period was only 10.5 percent. Similarly, total profits would con-
stitute some 31 percent of income, though in the interwar period
they appear never to have significantly exceeded 27 percent.
It might seem that a more reliable forecast could be obtained
by extrapolating the two relatively flat lines in Charts 4 and 5.
The Department of Commerce figure for gross national product in 1915 is $42.1
billion, for government expenditure $3 billion, leaving a gross private national
product of about $39 billion. Indirect taxes are not stated explicitly, but they can
be approximated by subtracting personal and corporate income taxes ($.7 billion)
from government expenditure. We thus obtain a figure for gross private product,
minus indirect taxes, of• about $37 billion; substituting this figure in Mosak's
equation, we obtain the above results.
48SeeAppendix reference E.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO' 405
CHAR T'4
Relation between Corporate Profits and National Income
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Both series trtdude corporate profits taxes.
Thisis essentially the procedure recommended by Woytiiisky; but
even this alternative, though certainly less misleading, must be
discarded, not only because it is too arbitrary but also because
it is otherwise theoretically unsatisfactory. In fact, any linear rela-
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IX THE PROFIT—INCOME RATIO
Follbwing the method used for savings, a income index
z
was according to the formula ,
den9te the real
in income. The
to-year two series are' remarkably similar
.0 / ther tqe/some tendencSri for the profit share t:o
/
we correlate th series (hereinafter denoted by X1) with
income (denoted by X2) we obtain a correlaition
of .88. A part of the unexplained variance can be
explained by adding a time trend (t) and the rate of change
inowholesale prices (X3)The addition of the latter variable seems
especially Department of çorpinerce esti-
thates of total profits' losses on
multiple correlation coefficient then rises to andthe following
iX
4D'or detaiJs of computation, see Appendix referenc&F...
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51 Itappears, in fact that profits were relatively highdn. years characterized by
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'molehr lésä priëé rthes, 1919, 1920, 193 Similarly,
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2iienotingthe variables andt by subscripts 1,3,and 4, respectively,
the relevant simple.and partial correlation coefficients,corresponding to regression
equation1 are r12 = r14 =—.54;r13 =.53; = —.o6; and
r13.24= +.66.Although the partial correlation between
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Equation IX 1 may be interpreted along the lines
for the savings problem. The share of income accruing to profits,
Xi, tends to fluctuate with income during each cycle, falling below
and moving toward the normal secular level—defined as the
level that corresponds to the normal secular growth of real income
and no marked price changes. This normal level may be estimated
from equation IX 1 as being about 26 percent at the end of the
'twenties and falling gradually. In years of secular growth, the
of the relatively large number of observations. The value of K is 1.86, which is not
significant (see note 14).FLUCTUATION IN SAVING-INCOME RATIO 409
profit share tends to fluctuate closely around this level, rising
above it if income rises at a faster rate and f ailing below it in the
opposite case.
This result may usefully be formulated also in terms of a mar-
ginal profit ratio. By manipulating equation IX 1, it can be shown
that instead of the single marginal profit ratio of some 40 percent
obtained by Mosak,we should distinguish between a secular one,
approximately equal to the normal profit ratio defined above, and
a cyclical one, exceeding the secular by an amount nearly as high
as the coefficient of This means that in the interwar period
the cyclical marginal profit ratio was as high as 45 to 50 percent.54
The difference between the marginal profit ratios corresponding
to secular and to cyclical income changes must, of course, be ex-
plained along lines quite different from those put foward in the
discussion of the savings problem. Without going into a long tech-
nical argument, we merely point out that this difference must have
to do partly with the difference between short- and long-run mar-
ginal costs. As long as output remains below the highest previous
peak it presumably fluctuates within the limits of existing capac-
ity; in that event, because of the rigidity of overhead costs, mar-
ginal gross and net profits approximately coincide. If, on the other
hand, productive capacity itself has to be increased, overhead
costs themselves are variables, and marginal net profits tend to
fall well below marginal gross profits. Abnormally high profits will,
of course, also tend to generate higher real wages through com-
petition and direct workers' pressure. The fact that, in the case
of a secular expansion of income, profits tend to be directly related
to the rate of change in income is likely to reflect, to some degree,
a lag of real wages behind changes in productivity and profits.
The cyclical (secular) marginal profit ratio measures the share of any cyclical
(secular) increase in income (in the sense of our definition) accruing to profits.
Verification from the original series is easy: For instance, of a nearly $45 billiou
fall in income from 1929 to 1932, profits accounted for over $20 billion, and of the
subsequent rise of $32 billion in 1932—37, profits accounted for nearly $16 billion.
A similar relation is found to hold also for the less pronounced cyclical fluctua-
tions, such as those in 1920—21 (when income fell about $19 billion and profits more
than $9 billion), and in 1937 and 1938. (when income fell some $8 billion and profits
some $4 billion).4110 @U'I'
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and on this basis,arriveat an estimate of 10 to 11 percent; Mosak's
estimate was nearly 16 percent.58 By 1945 this ratio was estimated
to be less than 12 percent, having fallen from a wartime peak of
15 percent; our forecast implies a further slight fall, while Mosak's
forecast implies a significant new rise.
X CORPORATE SAVINGS
The above results have important implications for the probable
future level of corporate savings. Clearly, if we expect corporate
profits to be fully a third lower than Mosak's estimates, we must
expect corporate savings also to be considerably smaller.
The problem of forecasting corporate savings has received much
less attention than that of forecasting individual savings, though
the strategic role of this variable in the business cycle is obviously
of great importance. Unfortunately, the problem is too complex
to be accorded a detailed quantitative analysis here. We must
point out once more, however, that no reliable conclusion can be
obtained by extrapolating (linearly or otherwise) the past relation
between corporate savings and profits.59 Indeed, if we correlate cor-
porate dividends, D, with profits, P, for 1921—40, we get a correla-
tion of only .60 and the following equation:
X 1 =3.3+
which would imply a corporate marginal propensity to save of
nearly 80 percent! Nor is this result greatly improved if we intro-
duce, as an additional variable, lagged income to account for the
fact that, in general, dividends are paid some time after income
58Ourforecast is again well below the ratio of 15 percent realized in 1941. The 1941
ratio was, however, exceptionally high, because of the very special conditions
prevailing in that year. If we extrapolate any of our equations to 1941 we obtain a
computed value for the share of corporate profits of nearly 14 percent. "Mosakdoes not give explicitly the equation used in his forecast of corporate
dividends and savings. From hi8 Table 2(op. cit., p. 39),it is found that the saving-
income ratio rises from zero for a net income of aboutbillion to a maximum
of some 35 percent for net incomes of about $13 billion, then falls again as income
rises above this figure. The logic of the assumption underlying these estimates is
not explained; Mosak merely says: "the projections of corporate savings out of
profits after taxes though estimated conservatively in the light of past data, are
necessarily arbitrary since there is no really adequate basis for projecting them"
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is earned.60 Again this absurd result is due to the fact that the
relation between corporate savings and income was quite different
in the period of steady expansion, 1922—29, from what it was dur-
ing the violent cyclical fluctuations of the 'thirties. Throughout
the 'thirties (and 1921), dividends paid at any level of income were
larger than those paid when the same level of income was first
reached in the expansion of the 'twenties; and, more generally,
they were larger than would be indicated by a line of relation based
on 1922—29. Once more one might be tempted to consider this
pattern the result of a time trend, but as we shall presently argue,
such a procedure would yield quite misleading conclusions.
Jan Tinbergen hasadvancedan interesting hypothesis to ac-
count for the above described behavior of corporate dividends:
aggregate dividends may be explained by current and lagged ag-
gregate profits and by the aggregate 'net surplus'. This hypothesis
gives an excellent fit for the period he investigated, 1919_32.81 His
approach was applied by us (using, however, a cruder estimate
for net surplus)62 to 1921—40. It must be remembered, however,
that in 1936—38 the undistributed profits tax was in force. Since
we are interested in estimating corporate dividend policy in the
absence of special measures aimed at discouraging saving, these
three years must be eliminated (see note 65). When this is done,
we obtain a multiple correlation of .98 and very high partial cor-
relations for all the variables.63 Denoting by N the net surplus, the
60 The multiple correlation coefficient is only .78 and the estimate of the marginal
propensity to save falls only slightly.
61 Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, Vol. 2, 'Business Cycles in the
United States of America, 1919—1932', League of Nations Economic Intelligence
Service (Geneva, 1939), p. 115.
62 For 1921—25 the estimates are taken from Tinbergen, op. cit., App. C, p. 205.
For 1926—36 'net surplus' of reporting corporations was used (Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1986, p. 192, and 1946, p. 298) with no adjustment for nonre-
porting corporations. The difference between the unadjusted and the adjusted
figures given by Tinbergen up to 1932 is rather small. The 'net surplus' figure
exhibits a sudden rise in 1937, apparently because 'surplus reserves' were shifted
from 'other liabilities' to 'net surplus'. This change in definition was crudely ad-
justed for by subtracting the change in 'other liabilities', 1936—37 (that is, $9.8
billion) from the 'net surplus' for the years after 1936.
6$ Denoting by the subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4, dividends, current income, lagged
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employmentlevel of profits in 1950, we consistently get an esti-
mate of betweenandAnd, finally, essentially the same re-
suits were obtained on the basis of two other regression equations,
briefly mentioned in note 79•69 A saving—income ratio significantly
above 30 percent could be expected only if 1949 were a relatively
depressed year so that 1950 income would be considerably larger.
In view of the agreement of the results from the various methods,
we consider our forecast faIrly reliable.
XI FORECASTING THE RELATION BETWEEN AGGREGATESAVINGS
ANDINCOME
We now assemble the results in an attempt to form an idea of the
aggregate level of savings to be expected at full employment in
1950.
Since individual savings were expressed in terms of disposable
income, and corporate savings in terms of national income (before
corporate taxes), it is necessary first to establish a• relation be-
tween these two quantities by means of a specific assumption with
respect to the structure of direct taxation. For this purpose and
to see more clearly the orders of magnitude involved, our various
estimates were converted from percentages to dollars, on the as-
sumption of $200 billion gross national product and 1940 rates of
taxation (Table 2). The $200 billion is chosen for convenience in
comparing our results with those of Mosak and Smithies, not as
an actual forecast, nevertheless, at the current level of prices, it
One way of establishing this result is as follows: net surplus at the end of 1942,
adjusted for surplus reserves (see note 62), was some $49 billion. Adding net cor-
porate savings for 1943—46, as estimated by the Department of Commerce, we ob-
tain $71 billion. Substitutingin X la we have:
'49
D'50=.15P'50+.18P'49+5.1 + .062
Toget the upper limit of the estimate, we take P'50=$16billion, a change at
the rate of 10 percent from 1949 to 1950, and accumulated reserves of $5to$10 bil-
lion, and obtain a saving-income ratio of about 34 percent. If, on the other hand,
we take P'50 =14billion and assume there will be no significant change from 1949
to 1950, the ratio is about 26 percent. No essential modification seems necessary if
the price level should change somewhat before 1949, because the net surplus may
be expected to be adjusted in the proper direction.
These two equations lead to a forecast of 25to30percent,depending on the rela-
tion between 1949and 1950netprofits.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 417
probably represents a fairly realistic assumption, though perhaps
somewhat too conservative. Our assumptions concerning taxes are
also not entirely arbitrary. To get an idea of the level of capital for-
mation necessary to bring about in the absence of
government intervention, we must assume an aggregate tax reve-
nue that will approximately balance federal and local government
As can be seen from Table. 2, the aggregate revenue
from the assumed tax structure is slightly over $30 billion—a rea-
sonable (though conservative) guess at what government expendi-
ture (federal and local) may amount to at current prices—and a
gross national product of $200 billion. Of course, the actual dis-
tribution of the aggregate tax burden among different forms of
taxation (indirect, personal, and corporate) may well be different
from the assumed one. But as long as the total tax burden is fixed,
variations in this respect, if within realistic limits, will not ma-
terially affect our results.
A gross national product of $200 billion and a tax structure that
would approximately balance federal and local budgets would
Iyieldan aggregate savings ranging from $19 to $201 For
the same gross national product and the same national income
before corporate taxes, Mosak's estimate of total savings, after
adjustment to equalize total tax collection, is some $271 billion.72
7°Onthis point see the criticism of Mosak's paper by A. G. Hart, op. cit., pp.
541—3. Hart rightly points out that the pessimism of Mosak's results is partly due
to his assumption of a tax revenue much in excess of his 'normal' government ex-
penditure.
Thisresult, it should be recalled, is predicated upon certain cyclical assump-
tions: income in 1950 (in real, as well as in money, terms) will not exceed that of
the highest previous year by significantly more than some 4 percent; and economic
activity in 1949 itself will not be seriously depressed. From the various regression
equations in the text, the reader may easily obtain different forecasts by varying
these assumptions as well as the assumptions concerning government revenue and
expenditure. Larger expenditures financed from taxes would lead to smaller say-
ings, and vice versa.
72Mosak'soriginal estimate is $6 billion for corporate savings and $20.8 billion for
individual savings. The latter figure, however, is not fully comparable with our
own estimates, since Mosak's aggregate tax revenue exceeds ours by about 10 per-
cent. If we adjust disposable income upward to equalize tax collection, his indi-
vidual savings figure rises to $21.4 billion, giving billion for total savings.
Smithies' estimates cannot be directly compared with the two estimates given
above, since he starts from a gross national product of $193 billion in 1943 prices
and makes different assumptions with respect to the tax structure. An approximate
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plained' with the variables that seem relevant to explain its move-
ments.
The recent contributions in the field of economic statistics by
Haavelmo, Koopmans, and others, indicate that this traditional
method is not fully warranted and may lead to biased estimates
of the parameters. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject the
reader is' referred to their The bias arises because the
given equation, whose parameters are to be estimated, is actually
only one of a more general system of equations which simultane-
ously determine the behavior of the economic variables. The ob-
served values of the variables that enter into the relevant relation
are not determined exclusively by the given equation, but by some
or all other equations of the system as well. It is therefore neces-
sary, before estimating the parameters, to set up a complete or
determined system of equations describing the behavior of the
economic system. This system, however, need not contain as many
equations as there are variables, because some variables that are
relevant in explaining the behavior of economic quantities are de-
termined outside the economic system, or for other reasons may
be considered data—for example, the weather, age structure of the
population, and also the past values of all variables. We call these
variables 'predeterminate', while the others, which are determined
by the simultaneous solution of the system, are termed 'endoge-
•nous' variables. The system will therefore be complete or de-
termined if it contains as as there are endogenous
variables. Once the complete system has been set up, 'unbiased
estimates' of the parameters of any equation can be obtained by
a procedure that takes into account the restriction imposed by the
land Meeting', Econometrica, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1946, p. 162). As gross capital
formation amounted to about $11 billion, if we allow for a rise in price of about 50
percent, this forecast implies a gross capital formation at current prices of $30—33
billion.
See, for example, Trygve Haavelmo, 'The Statistical Implications of a System
of Simultaneous Equations', Ecoñomefrica, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan. 1943), pp. 1—12,
and 'The Probability Approach in Econometrics', Econometrica, Vol. 12, Supple-
ment (July 1944), especially Ch. 5; Tjalling Koopmans, Statistical Estimation of
Simultaneous Economic Relations, Cowles Commission Papers, New Series, No.
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other on the endogenous variables entering
the given relation.
We do not intend to make an extensive application of these new
methods to our problem, especially since an over-all description
of the properties of the new method and of the procedures is not
yet available. To one problem, however—the most important, or,
at any rate, the most controversial, of those with which we are con-
cerned in this paper—this method may be applied with some justi-
fication and not too serious difficulty: estimating the parameters
of the consumption function.
If we are willing to make a certain assumption common in the
current literature, the consumption function may be embedded in
a very simple system of equations. First, according to our hy-
pothesis, the consumption function for individuals has the form:
where et is the disturbance associated with this equation. Since
savings, 2, is the difference between consumption and income, we
may write:
XII 1 —(1— + CYg° + a =—e1
•Furthermore, because of the statistical definition of the series of
consumption and income, we have the following identity:
XII 2 S =Y—C=netgovernment deficit76
• + net capital formation —corporatesavings
The assumption referred to above consists in considering net
government deficit and net capital formation predeterminate vari-
ables. This assumption is not entirely unwarranted; it may, in
fact, be admitted that both variables are at least partly the result
of decisions that do not depend directly on current economic de-
velopments. If we could treat corporate savings as a predetermi-
nate variable, equations XII 1 and XII 2 would form a determi-
nate system consisting of two equations and two endogenous
variables, S and Y, plus several predeterminate variables. Obvi-
ously, however, there is no justification whatever for treating cor-
76Netgovernment deficit is defined asthedifference between government receipts
(including social security contributions) and government expenditure on goods
and services plus transfôr payments.422 PART V
porate savings as 'predeterminate. To meet this difficulty, we may
replace the variable V by a new variablç Y', so defined as to in-
clude corporate savings (that is, Y is the sum of disposable income
and corporate savings). Then V' minus C will represent the sum
of individual and corporate savings, which we denote 8'. Equation
XII 2 becomes:
XII 2a2' =netgovernment deficit + net capital formation
On the basis of our previous assumption, 8' may be treated as a
predeterminate variable. With regard to the factors governing ag-
gregate savings of individuals and corporations, we shall again test
the hypothesis:
XII la + + + + D =
Thelogic of this hypothesis for individual savings has already been
explained at length. But' from the brief discussion in Section X, it
should be clear that the relation between corporate savings and
income tends to follow a cyclical-secular pattern fundamentally
similar to that which seems to hold for individual savings. As long
as profits rise steadily from year to year, dividends tend to keep
pace with profits (in terms of equation X la, N rises when P rises),
and the saving—income ratio depends essentially on the rate of
change in income." But if, after a period of expansion, profits
undergo a cyclical fall, dividends will tend to fall proportionally
much less than income; in other words, savings will fall propor-
tionally much more than income. In Section X, it is true, it was
found that if the depression is protracted and is accompanied
by gradual deflation, the normal secular relation between savings
and profits will tend to be reestablished even though money
profits do not go back to the initial level.78 But this is mainly
because we were dealing there with variables measured in money
instead of in 'real' terms. While in an expanding economy 'real'
As may be seen from equation X la, a certain critical growth of income will
keep the saving-income ratio at an approximately unchanged level; in years in
which income rises faster, the saving-income ratio will temporarily rise above this
level, and vice versa.
78Interms of equation X la, N will gradually fall as a result of dissavings, bank-
ruptcy, and writing down of assets, so that a normal relation between income and
surplus tends to be gradually reestablished.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 423
profits may be expected to return sooner or later to the initial
level, money profits evidently need never recover.79 In equation
XII la, the effect of deflation on the relation between corporate
income and profits is allowed for by using deflated instead of
current values.
It must be admitted that the relation postulated in this equation
is theoretically less satisfactory than the separate relationships
considered in preceding sections. On the other hand, by estimating
the parameters of this 'aggregate savings function' by a different
and presumably more reliable technique, we shall have a check
on our earlier results and forecasts. Furthermore, we shall be able
to make more reliable comparisons with the results obtained for
Canada and Sweden, where our estimates include corporate as well
as individual savings.
Since equations XII la and 2a form a determinate system, we
may proceed to estimate the parameters of XII la by the new
'simultaneous equations' method, which in the present case
amounts to fitting the equation by least squares and minimizing
in the direction of(that is, takingas a dependent variable).
The traditional single equation method would lead to minimizing
in the direction of S(that is, taking S as the dependent van-
able). Using 1921—40 as the period of observation, the equation
is (all variables expressed in deflated dollars on a per capita ba-
sis):80
XII 3 =—3+ —
The multiple èorrelation, .991, and all relevant and partial. correla-
tions are highly significant.81 Essentially the same results are ob-
" In fact, if we replace N in equation X la with the highest previous cyclical peak
of profits (the cyclical peak being used to allow for the effect of deflation) we again
get a fairly good explanation of corporate dividends (the multiple correlation is
.91 and the partial correlation between dividends andis .67). The correspond-
ing regression equation was used to check our forecast of savings for 1950. The
other equationused for this purpose was obtained by replacing the highest previ-
'ous cyclical peak of profits with the corresponding dividends. The results are very
similar.
80 For the derivation of the series, see Appendix reference H.
81 Denoting by the subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4, the variables Y'g, S's, re-
spectively, the relevant simple and partial correlation coefficients corresponding
to equation XII 3 are: .91; na =.74;r14 =.01;r12.84= .978; .84;
.86;and =.991.The value of K is 1.50, which is not significant (see note 14).424 PART V
tamed if in estimating the parameters of XII la, 1936—38 are
omitted because• of the undistributed profits tax.82 By analyzing
equation XII 3 along the usual lines (a task left to the interested
reader) it will be seen that the results are fairly close to those ob-
tained for Canada (when the necessary conceptual adjustments
are made) and for Sweden. Comparison with equation III 3, on
the other hand, reveals how strongly the rigidity of corporate divi-
dends affects the cyclical between consumption and in-
come.
With regard to the secular relation, it will be noted that the
constant term in equation XII 3 is entirely negligible; this again
supports our hypothesis that in the long run the average propen-
sity to save tends to be constant independent of the secular
expansion of incomel Nonetheless, because of the strong lag, the
proportion of income saved in years of secular expansion may fluc-
tuate considerably about the normal level, depending on the rate
of change in income.
It will be recalled that the forecasts developed in Section XI
were based on the assumption for 1950 of a secular rate of increase
in income centering on 3 percent: If the rate is 3 percent, the ratio
S'/Y' from equation XII 3 approximates 11.7 percent. Also, on
the basis of the assumption underlying Table 2, Y' =.92Y,
whence =(S'/Y')(Y'/Y) =10.8percent. The equation
obtained when 1936—38 are omitted yields (as one would expect)
a slightly higher ratio S '/ Y '—some 12.5 percent—which implies
A multiple correlation of .991 is rather impressive when one considers that we are
here relating income to saving, not to consumption. Since consumption consti-
tutes a very substantial part of income, the correlation between those two vari-
ables is bound to be high, but this is not necessarily so in the case of savings, which
constitutes a much smaller proportion of income.
82Thisomission appears especially advisable since in each of the three years (and
especially in 1936) actual savings were less than the value computed from equation
XII 3. Inclusion of these three years may therefore cause estimates of 8' based on
equation XII 3 to be biased downward. The equation obtained when we omit the
three years is:
XII 3a =—17+ .242Y'g°
The multiple and partial correlations all rise somewhat =.993).FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 425
S '/Y =11.5percent. As both results are within the range of our
earlier forecast, we have no reason to modify our conclusions.
Note that since the normal secular growth of income also may
be taken to be in the order of 2 to 3 percent, the above values of
S '/Y (or S '/Y') represent also an approximate measure of the
normal secular saving—income ratio and of the long-run marginal
propensity to save. If, on the other hand, we fail to take into ac-
count the influence of cyclical factors and of the lag, and simply
correlate income and savings, we obtain the regression equation:
=—236+ (r =.91)
We would be led to conclude that the marginal propensity to save
amounts to nearly 50 percent, regardless how income changes. The
difference between the two estimates is so striking and its implica-
tions for purposes of forecasting so obvious that no further com-
ments are required.
If the parameters of equation XII la are estimated by the tra-
ditional form of fitting, the result is:
XII 4 =+2.7+ .49Y'€ — 1 —
Detailed comparison of XII 3 and XII 4 reveals that, in
the present case, the differences between the estimates obtained
by the two approaches are definitely minor, especially when com-
pared with the many other errors that may affect the estimates.83
One last point in connection with equation XII 3 is worth brief
consideration. Since this equation relates total savings to income,
it may be used to gather some information on the probable size
of the so-called 'investment multiplier' and to clarify one appar-
ently puzzling problem that arises in this connection.
As we have seen, the consumption functions obtained by other
investigators are usually characterized by a relatively low mar-
ginal propensity to consume; consequently, they tend to yield rela-
tively low forecasts for aggregate consumption when extrapolated
" In the case of Canada the following consumption function is obtained by apply-
ing the new method:
=— .02+ .O5Yg + +.24Yt°; .984)
Thereader may compare this equation directly with equation VI la.
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tovalues of income above those prevailing in the period of observa-
tion. To those who have questioned the realism of these high
estimates of the marginal propensity to save, the answer has been
that if this parameter actually were considerably lower, our eco-
nomic system would be highly unstable. If, for instance, the pro-
pensity were only 10 percent, the multiplier would be as large as
10 and every small shock would cause violent fluctuations in
the system. Since the available statistical. information shows
that the violent changes in investments during the 'thirties pro-
duced proportionally much smaller. changes in income, we would
have no choice but to accept the conclusion that the marginal
propensity to save is relatively high and that the saving—income
ratio will therefore keep rising as income rises.84
As should be clear by now,. this argument is fundamentally
wrong, arising as it does from a confusion between the short-run
and the secular relation between savings and income. The multi-
plier can be derived only from the cyclical, not from the secular,
marginal propensity to save, for two reasons: (1) the multiplier is,
and can only be, a short-run tool of analysis; (2) if we have approx-
imately full employment to start with, the multiplier analysis
breaks down or, at least, serves no useful purpose. Indeed, in the
latter event, the real income multiplier is simply zero. Nor is the
money income multiplier (assuming that such a stable multiplier
exists) of much use in determining the rise to be expected in the
price level, for under inflationary conditions the relation between
savings and income may be expected to change.85 Since the co-
efficient ofin equation XII 3 is only .51, if investments (plus
the net government deficit) increase by an amountI above the
preceding year, income will rise by an amount =(.11.51)I
84 In this connection, see, for instance, Mosak's reply to Hart's criticism in 'Na-
tional Budgets and National Policy', American Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. I
(March 1946), pp.20—43. This point is implicit in most of Section B and is brought
out more explicitly in note 30.
85 It has been shown, for example, that, at least under certain assumptions, once
inflation develops, the marginal propensity to save tends to coincide with the 'full
employment' ratio ,of savings to income. See, for instance, Franco Modigliani,
'Liquidity Preference and .the Theory of Interest and Money', Econometrica, Vol.
12, No. 1 (Jan. 1944), pp. 45—90.FLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 427
=2I. If the new higher level of investment is maintained for a
sufficient length of time, income will continue to rise, and the total
/
incrementin income will approach the valueV
=51—14
=2.7I. Thus, what we may call the impact multiplier is
only 2, while its limiting upper value is still below 3•86Inconsider-
ing these results, it is well to keep in mind that our estimates of
the parameters of equation XII 3 are necessarily subject to error
and, in addition, that we cannot count on perfect stability of
saving habits, especially cyclical saving habits. We are inclined
to believe, nonetheless, that the above estimates give a reliable
idea of the order of magnitude of the multiplier and a realistic
starting point for problems of economic policy.-
Butthese results, we repeat, in no way imply that we cannot
have full employment in 1950 without a stupendous level of in-
vestments (and/or government deficit). The level of income cor-
responding to a given level of investments depends not on the
marginal but on the average propensity to save, which, in turn,
depends not only on the slope but also on the position of the short-
run consumption function. And our analysis indicates that if in-
come continues to rise secularly, as we may expect it will, the posi-
tion of the short-run consumption function too may be expected
to rise gradually.
XIII WIDER IMPLICATIONS
To sum up: this paper suggests that in studying past relations be-
tween national income and its components, attention should be
given to the possible influence of the cyclical position of the econ-
omy. We found for each series analyzed a marked and significant
difference between the cyclical or short-run and the secular rela-
86Themultiplier derived here is merely one of many possible multipliers that may
be defined; it gives essentially the increase in aggregate 'factors' income', net of
taxes, to be expected from a unit increase in net investments plus government
deficit. Other multipliers may be derived from the one given above and estimates
of other parameters (such as tax structure and the relation of business reserves to
income). The conclusion in the text is substantially unchanged if equation XII 3a
(see note 82)insteadof XII 3 is used.428 PART V
tion. Extrapolating the secular relation under specific cyclical as-
sumptions, we obtained estimates for the near future significantly
different from other current forecasts. In particular, we found that
the share of aggregate income accruing to profits (especially to
corporate profits) and the saving—income ratio may be expected
to be substantially lower than when estimated by the usual
method. This conclusion is of special importance since it suggests
that though the task of maintaining full employment may well be
difficult in the near future, the dark pessimism of many current
investigations is not fully justified. Our results encourage optimism
also in that they show that income is probably less sensitive to
fluctuations in the level of investments than is usually supposed.
We have seen, in fact, that the behavior of savers, especially cor-
porations, has tended to act, and may therefore be expected to act
in the future, as a powerful stabilizer. While the maintenance of
the secular expansion of income may be expected to require net
investments of some 11 to 12 percent of income, a fall in invest-
ments may be expected to reduce real income not by 9 times, but
only by 2 to 3 times.
The results of our investigation have certain broader implica-
tions of a methodological nature. The. starting point of our whole
approach is the recognition that the relation between economic
variables need not be, and frequently is not, symmetric or rever-
sible. The change in X1 associated with a given change in X2 may
depend on the nature of the change in X2. The reasons for this
irreversibility are, of course, different for different relations. In the
case of the consumption function, for example, it is partly due to
the irreversibility of consumption habits. In the case of profits,
it is probably due partly to the asymmetric behavior of overhead
costs which are largely fixed as long as output fluctuates below
capacity but become variable when capacity has to be increased.
In the case of corporate dividends, it probably reflects the direct
and indirect influence of the net surplus position, as Tinbergen
suggested.
But these are obviously not the only cases of irreversibility.
Many other instances can readily be found. A typical case, forFLUCTUATION IN THE SAVING—INCOME RATIO 429
example, is that associated with short- and long-run supply
schedules in the Marshallian sense. The quantity supplied at any
given price at point of time t will depend upon the existing capac-
ity, say qg°. As long as the price remains below a certain critical
level (given by the long-run supply schedule) at which it pays to
expand capacity, both price and output will move along a short-
run supply schedule, say= But if the price remains
for some time sufficiently high to induce an expansion of capacity
to a new level, q°(t + 0),theshort-run supply schedule will itself
shift upward (if quantity is measured on the vertical axis), and
the quantity supplied at any given price will tend to be larger than
before capacity was expanded.
To give one more example of irreversibility, the distribution of
total employment by main branches of economic activity may be
expected to be closely related, in a given country, to the level of
real income. At the same time, theoretical considerations, which
are confirmed by preliminary investigations carried out for the
United States and for Sweden, suggest that the effect of a given
change in income on the distribution of employment may be ex-
Ipected to differ substantially depending on whether the change in
income is of a secular or of a cyclical nature. The irreversibility
in this case is due not oniy to the rigidity of consumption habits,
Ibut also, and even more especially, to differences in the employ-
ment structure of different economic sectors. Sectors in which
the self-employed play a larger role or, more generally, in which
the ratio of employers to employees is relatively high (for ex-
ample, trade, services, agriculture) will tend to be less affected
by a cyclical fall in income (and therefore also by a cyclical rise in
income) than sectors in which this ratio is relatively low (for
example, manufacturing, mining, transportation). The effect of
a secular rise in income, on the' other hand, obviously bears no
necessary relation to the ratio of employers to employees.87 In
general, therefore, cyclical and secular changes in income will have
an asymmetric effect on the distribution of employment. In
87Forinstance, in trade and services a secular rise in income has been accompanied
in the past by a relative increase in employment, but in agriculture the opposite
has been true.430 PART V
particular, it is entirely possible (and this seems to be true, for
example, for the service industries) that a cyclical rise in income
will be accompanied by a fall in the proportion of people em-
ployed in a given sector, whereas a secular rise in income will be
accompanied by a rise in this proportion; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the proportion employed in a given sector will
tend to rise both when income falls cyclically and when income
rises secularly.
Many more examples of irreversible relations could be cited.
Indeed, irreversibility may be expected to occur whenever eco-
nomic expansion creates certain new obstacles; consequently, if a
contraction takes place, the variables will follow a different path
from the one they followed before obstacles had been created by
the expansion..Rigidities of this type are likely to be quite wide-
spread in our economic system.
Such irreversible relations have not always been sufficiently
recognized in the past, or, if recognized, have not infrequently
been explained by time trends. 'Indeed, in an expanding economy,
the gradual shift of the short-run schedule along the long-run
schedule may easily give the appearance of a time trend, especially
if the expansion is fairly steady. But in many cases these apparent
trends can and should be resolved into what they really are—
systematic relations among economic variables. The establish-
ment and estimation of these relations, whenever possible,
amounts to replacing a trend factor, whose value depends only on
the passage of time and that can be extrapolated only mechani-
cally, with one whose value depends on the actual performance of
the economic system. Our results jndicate that this method of
analysis, quite apart from its greater theoretical elegance, may be
of great practical importance in problems of forecasting since it
may enable us to improve our estimates of the short-run relation
as well as our long-range forecasts. In fact, whenever the relation
is irreversible, the observed values of the variable will lie on
different short-run schedules. Hence the equation of relationob-.
tamed by simple correlation, or -by any other method of estima-
tion that does not properly take into account the irreversible
nature of the relation, will describe neither the long- nor the short-
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These considerations are especially important for those engaged
in analyzing the American economy, since many statistical series
are available only from 1929 or, at best, from the early 'twenties.
The period from 1929 to 1941 consists essentially of a single cycle
even the longer period is entirely dominated by the violent
cyclical fluctuations of the 'thirties; therefore, whenever the given
relation is cyclically sensitive, estimates of the parameters based
on this period of observation are in danger of being cyclically
biased to a marked degree. The danger implicit in this situation
is further increased by the fact that the war economy tended in
many cases (for example, in the profit-income relation, the saving-
income relation, the distribution of employment) to continue the
cyclical relation of the 'thirties; in some cases this relation held
until the very end of the war. This situation only heightens the
illusion that the relation of 1929—41 can be safely extrapolated
into the post-transitional period.
XIV POSTSCRIPT: THE REVISED DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE ESTIMATES
After this paper had been completed and circulated, the Depart-
ment of Commerce series, on which the statistical analysis for the
United States had been based, were thoroughly revised, and the
new estimates published in 'National Income', Survey of Current
Business, Supplement, July 1947. For most series, the revisions
are relatively slight, but for individual savings and, to some ex-
tent, for corporate savings, they are drastic. For example, for
1929 the estimate of individual savings was cut some 60 percent
(from $8.8 to $3.7 billion) and that of corporate savings more than
•doubled (from $1.2 to $2.6 billion). These revisions are partly ex-
plained by changes in the definitions of the various series. Never-
theless, the revisions of a purelystatistical nature are aLso sub-
stantial, as can be seen by comparing the earlier Department of
Commerce estimate of savings with the series in Table 3. We
computed these series on the basis of the revised Department of
Commerce estimates, using as far as possible the definitions on
which the earlier estimates were based. (This task was greatly
facilitated by some very useful tables of reconciliation in the pub-
lication citedabove.) In 1929, for instance, the revision of a purely432 PARTV
nature amounts to some 50 percent for individual sav-
ings and to some 70 percent for corporate savings.
TABLE 3
Revised Estimates of Disposable Income and Personal Savings, 1929—41
and 1946
(billions of dollars)
Disposable Incomea Personal Savingsb Corporate Savings0
1929 78.0 4.3 2.0
1930 68.7 2.8 —3.5
1931 58.6 1.8 —5.6
1932 44.1 —1.4 —6.2
1933 42.9 — .3 —2.7
1934 49.1 .2 . —1.9
1935 .55.5 2.2 —1.0
1936 ' 63.6 4.3 — .7
1937 68.4 4.7 —.5
1938 62.4 1.5 —1.3
1939 67.4 • 3.6 .8
1940 72.8 •4.6 1.9
1941 89.1 11.1 4.4 •
1946 153.3 16.8
The estimates are based as far as possible on the definitions underlying the old
series given in the Appendix Table and may therefore be directly compared with
them.
aThisseries was obtained as follows (all references in this and subsequent notes
are to 'National Income', Survey of Current Business, Supplement, July 1947):
Personal income, old concepts statistically revised (p. 14, Table VII)
minus personal tax and nontax payments (p. 19, Table 3);
minus indirect taxes on owner-occupied dwellings (p. 14, Table VII);
plus change in farm inventories not held for sale.
bThisseries was obtained as follows:
Disposable income
minus personal consumption expenditure, old concept statistically revised.




minus net imputed rent on owner-occupied dwellings;
minus indirect taxes on owner-occupied dwellings;
minus depreciation on owner-occupied dwellings;
minus institutional depreciation;
minus income in kind to armed forces (all from p. 14, Table VII).
This series was obtained as follows:
Corporate undistributed profits (p. 19, Table 1)
minus corporate depletion allowances (p. 47, Table 38). Figures for the latter
series are not given after 1943; accordingly, no figure for 1946 is shown in this
column.
Obviously it would be desirable to retest our hypothesis for the
United States, and to re-estimate the parameters of our equations
on the basis of 'the revised estimates. To make a reliable test, how-
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Unfortunately, revised estimates are available only as far back
as 1929. We understand that the Department of Commerce is
carrying the estimates back to 1919, but it will be some time be-
fore this task is completed.
We attempted to extrapolate the revised estimates from 1929
back to 1921 by means of the old estimates and other statistical
information. Several methods were tried, all based largely on the
consumption series prepared by Harold Barger,88 which appears
to be conceptually quite close to the Department of Commerce
series and agrees remarkably well with the revised estimates for
All the estimates obtained by the various methods displayed a
similar pattern, close to that of the old estimates of savings.
Savings are found to be negligible .and possibly negative in 1921;
they rise sharply from 1921 to 1923, the 1923 figures reaching ap-
proximately the 1929 level. Between 1924 and 1928 our estimates
are, in all cases, lower than for 1923 and 1929, and exhibit rather
pronounced and apparently unsystematic fluctuations; further-
more, the results differ with each method of estimation. The doubt
thus cast on the reliability of the estimates was strongly re-en-
forced by the following test. We applied the very same methods
used for extrapolation to 1929—37 and compared the results with
the Department of Commerce estimates. The discrepancy, though
relatively small for consumption, was quite sizable for savings,
which are a residual; the average absolute discrepancy for each
method tried was in the order of 20 percent but the average
percentage discrepancy was considerably higher—more than 30
percent. Since the margin of error must be expected to be larger
for the years before 1929 (when the components of our estimates
•are obtained by extrapolation rather than by interpolation), we
•88 Outlayand Income in the United States, (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1942).
89For1929—37 the average absolute discrepancy is some $700 million. Part, how-
ever, is to be attributed to a significant difference in the estimates of net imputed
rent on owner-occupied nonf arm dwellings, which is not surprising in view of the
somewhat arbitrary character of these estimates. Eliminating imputed rent, the
average absolute discrepancy is $500 million with a maximum of about $1 billion
in 1936. The average discrepancy is some $300 million, Barger's estimates being
larger. In 1938 there is an exceptionally large discrepancy, $1.6 billion, but this is
not very signifcant since Barger's data for this year were probably less reliable.434 S PARTV
concluded that our series for 1921—28 were far too unreliable to
be used for purposes of quantitative statistical analysis, and for
this reason we do not reproduce them here.
Despite these unsatisfactory results, some very tentative con-
clusions may be drawn from the revised estimates available from
1929 on and from our own crude estimates for 1921—28. In what
follows, we mean by revised estimates the series in Table 3, which
are conceptually comparable, as far as possible, with the old esti-
mates.
In at least one respect the revised estimates give further in-
direct support to our hypothesis that the relation between con-
sumption and income 1929—40 has a cyclical character and cannot
safely be extrapolated to secular changes in income. Several fac-
tors point in this direction. If we compute the line of regression
of savings on income' for 1929—40, which, on the basis of our defini-
tions, are all within the, same cycle, the following results are ob-
tained:
XIV 1 =—114+ (r .95)
The corresponding results on the basis of the old data are:
XIV 2 =—75+ (r= .95)
Comparison of these two equations reveals that on the basis of
the revised estimates the regression line is even steeper and the
constant term even larger than on the basis of the old estimates.
We have therefore even more ground to suspect that equation
XIV 1 can represent oniy a cyclical relation.
This point is further strengthened when we consider that, ac-
cording to the revised estimates, in each of the years 1932—34
savings were negative or practically zero—to be explained only as
a cyclical phenomenon. When the same level of income was first
reached in the course of the secular expansion (probably during
the first decade of the century), savings must have been sub-
stantial; Indeed, unless they were, per capita income could scarcely
have expanded further. The irreversible character of the saving-
income relation is indicated also by our crude, estimates for 1921—
28, though these estimates are 'not sufficiently reliable for a rigor-
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Finally, according to the Department of Commerce estimates,
individual savings, even in 1946, were about 11 percent, some-
what smaller than the figure obtained by extrapolating equation
XIV 1, 12 percent, although in 1946 savings were bolstered by the
inclusion of profits on inventories of unincorporated business,
which were unprecedentedly high.9° crude estimate, based
on the data presented in the Midyear Econcnmic Report of the
President, dated July 21, 1947, suggests that in the first half of
1947 the saving-income ratio was even more significantly short
of the figure indicated by the regression line, namely, somewhat
less thanpercent.9' Of course, in the light of the special con-
ditions prevailing in these years, the weight that can be attached
to the above facts is limited.
In any event, there seems little doubt that the new data streng-
then the view that if a stable functional relation between savings
and income exists at all, it must be irreversible and must have a
steeper slope incase of cyclical changes in income (or, at any
rate, in the short run) than in the case of secular changes (in the
long run). Smithies' could explain, to some extent,
the short-run steepness of the saving-income relation as due to a
pure trend. On this point, however, the revised data shed some
light. The hypothesis of a pure time trend, whether or not logically
satisfactory, was at least statistically tenable on the basis of the
old data. On the basis of the new data it appears hardly tenable.
In fact, if we introduce time as a third variable into equation
XIV 2 we get a partial correlation of —.70—nota very high
coefficient but still definitely significant. However, if time is in-
troduced into equation XIV1,the partial correlation coefficient
for this variable is only —.15—entirelyinsignificant. It thus
appears that a time trend can no longer be adduced to explain
the of the saving-income relation.
Unfortunately, lacking reliable data for the years before 1929,
we are not in a position to test whether the apparent irreversibility
9°Theseprofits are included in savings in accordance with the earlier concept. If
we take into account the inventory valuation adjustment, the proportion saved
can be estimated to be about 10 percent.
Ifwe make the inventory valuation adjustment, the proportion is estimated to
be about 7.5 percent.436 PART V
of the saving-income relation can be adequately explained by the
fundamental hypothesis of our equation III 2, namely, that in
years of secular expansion, the proportion of income saved tends
to fluctuate closely around a constant value with deviations that
are directly related to the rate of change in income. On the basis
of the available data, however, we can make conjectures about the
form the savings function would. take if our hypothesis is sup-.
ported by the data to be made available in the future. Using the
result of equation XIV 1 as an estimate of the cyclical relation
between individual savings and income, the savings function
would take the form:
XIV3
=a+
adenotes a constant not very significantly differ-
ent from zero; the estimate of .06 (more probably between .06 and
.07) for the coefficient ofin the right side of the equation is
based on the saving-income ratio in 1929, 1937, and 1940. A test
of this equation will have to wait until the Department of Com-
merce supplies us with more reliable estimates for 1919_28.92
The above remarks refer mainly to saving by individuals. An
attempt was made to retest equation XII 3 too. The revised esti-
mates of corporate savings, adjusted to conform with the old defi-
were extrapolated back to 1921. The results seem con-
siderably more reliable than those obtained for individual savings.
Combining these estimates with our previous estimates of indi-
vidual savings and carrying out the same correlation analysis as
for equation XII 3, we again obtained very favorable statistical
results (the multiple correlation coefficient is .987 and the partial
coefficients range from .77 forto .98 for Se). But, in view of the
unreliability of the on individual savings, the estimates of the
parameters are not considered worth reproducing here. Once more
we have reason for confidence in the tenability of our hypothesis,
but we must await more reliable data before rigorous tests can be
applied.
92Thesaving-income ratio for the first half of 1947 appears to be still somewhat
above the level indicated by equation XIV 3.
"Theonly significant change in definition appears to be the inclusion of the de-
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One further point deserves brief consideration. We have stressed
elsewhere in this paper the desirability of devoting as much atten-
tion and ingenuity to the study of business savings as has been
devoted to individual savings. The revised estimates reenforce our
plea. One of the most significant effects of the revision (aside from
its effect on the morale of the econometricians who put confidence
in the old estimates) has been to alter radically the relative con-
tribution of the various components to aggregate savings (Table
4).
TABLE 4
Composition of Savings, 1929 and 1940
Original, Statistically Revised, and New Estimates
Net Savings Gross Savings
Old Old
Old Statis. New Old Statis. New
Rev. Rev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1929
Total, billions of dollars 10.0 6.3 6.3 18.6 14.4 14.9
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Individual 88 68 59 47 29 25
Corporate 12 32 41 6 14 17
Deprec. & other res. 47 57 58
1940
Total, billions of dollars 8.2 7.6 8.2 17.3 14.1 14.3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Individual 80 71 61 42 33 26
Corporate 20 29 39 11 13 17
Deprec. & other res. 47 54 47
'National Income', Survey of Current Business, Supplement, July 1947.
Saving by individuals, which, according to the old estimates,
represented more thanof net and nearlyof gross savings, now
represent less thanand aboutrespectively.As columns 2 and
5 of Table 4 indicate, the change in the structure of savings is by
no means merely a matter of definition. Consequently, while the
study of the consumption functions remains of great importance,
it becomes imperative to give close attention to the laws of the438 PART V
formation of business savings; including capital consumption
which now appear to constitute by far the largest
component of the nation's aggregate savings.
APPENDIX
In the following references the symbols (1), (2).. refer to the
series reproduced in the corresponding columns of the Appendix
Table.
(1) —(2) ASaving-income ratio:
. . Ye—Y'g• B Cyclical income index
Ye
Yg:(3)
highest figure of (3) preceding the given year (for in-
stance, Y'24° =594, =594,Y'26° =596,etc.).Until 1921
the highest peacetime income seems to have occurred in 1919.
Deflated by the. BLS cost-of-living index, as was income for the
remaining years, it would amount to $598. There are, however,
reasons to believe that this index underestimates the level of prices
in 1919 and 1920. If we use the index Kuznets computed to deflate
consumer outlay (National Income and Its Composition, 19.19—1938,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941, p. 145, Table 4,
col. 3), which otherwise agrees well with the BLS index, we obtain
a real income figure for 1919 of only $551. In view of this wide
discrepancy, for 1921—22 and 1923 was taken as $575, the
simple average of the two figures cited above.
C Canadian income and consumption estimates
Income: (1) gross national product minus (2) international bal-
ance on interest and dividends deflated by (6) cost-of-living index
on a 1929 basis. Consumption: (1) gross national product minus
(2) international balance on interest and dividends minus (3)
gross capital formation (including expenditure on consumer dur-
"The available data do not at all support the assumption, made more or less
tacitly in much of the theoretical literature, that capital consumption allowances
are approximately proportional to the value of production.TABLE








(billions of dollars) (billions of dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1909 28.7 8.5 2.2 59
1910 30.4 8.7 2.3 62
1911 30.5 8.3 2.0 62
1912 32.9 9.5 2.5 66
1913 34.8 9.8 2.8 65
1914 33.9 9.0 1.9 66
1915 37.0 11.0 2.9 67
1916 44.8 15.2 5.3 73
1917 53.720.1 6.1
1918 58.3 17.2 3.9
1919 63.5 68.2 22.8 5.7 115.2
192066.8 69.5 17.2 3.9 129.4
1921 52.8 50.5 467 51.7 8.5 2.8 105.2
1922 57.0 52.0 530 59.5 14.2 3.9 2.9 99.6
1923 66.1 57.8 594 69.5 17.2 5.2 3.6 100.8
1924 66.7 60.9 586 69.1 16.4 4.3 3.6 101.3
1925 70.6 63.,0 596 73.7 19.2 5.5 4.2 102.4
1926 73.2 66.3 604 76.6 19.2 5.84.5 103.3
1927 73.5 66.0 610 75.9 18.0 5.1 4.8 100.5
1928 75.4 68.8 625 78.7 19.4 6.3 5.2 100.9
1929 79.6 70.8 654 83.3 20.8 7.2 6.0 100.0
1930 70.7 64.9 589 68.9 11.7 1.7 5.6 97.1
1931 59.6 54.2 542 54.5 5.7 —1.6 4.2 87.4
1932 45.6 43.0 459 40.0 1.2 —3.6 2.8 78.5
1933 44.5 42.4 470 42.3 5.9 —.6 2.2 75.6
1934 51.0 47.7 517 49.5 8.0 .5 2.6 80.0
1935 56.3 52.2 552 55.7 11.2 1.7 3.0 81.2
1936 65.2 59.1 630 64.9 14.7 3.8 4.7 81.2
1937 69.2 62.5 641 71.5 15.8 3.9 4.7 84.6
1938 62.9 58.5 589 64.2 11.8 1.7 3.2 81.8
1939 67.7 61.7 638 70.8 15.4 4.2 3.8 80.5
1940 72.9 65.7 675 77.6 17.8 5.84.0 81.6
1941 88.7 74.6 776 96.9 24.3 8.54.5 87.6
aUnpublishedestimates kindly supplied by the Department of Commerce.
b Series of column 1 divided by United States population and deflated by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics cost-of-living index.
0Indexused to deflate national income. 1921—41: price index implicit in the De..
partment of Commerce estimates of national income in average 1935—39 dollars
(Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. 25, No. 2,May 1943, p. 108, Table 1, col. 5a)
convertedto a 1929 basis. 1914—20: Simon Kuznets, National Product in Wartime
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1945), p. 132, App. Table III 4, line 5;
splicedto the previous series in' 1919 and 1920. 1909—13: weighted average of Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board cost-of-living index (weighted in proportion
to the ratio of consumer expenditure to national income) and price index of
producer durable commodities from William H.Shaw,'Finished Commodities
since 1879',NationalBureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 3 (1941),
p. 7, Table lb.
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ables) plus (4) domestic production of motor cars plus (5) imports
of motor cars deflated by (6) cost-of-living index. (Since the original
source includes under gross capital formation consumer as well as
• producer .durables, and does not give details of the two categories,
items (4) and (5) were added as a crude adjustment to include in
consumption at least the expenditure on passenger cars.)
Sources: (1) and (2), Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Business
Statistics Branch, Monthly Review of Business Statistics, March
1944, p. 15; (3), ibid., April 1944, p. 38; (4), 'Auto-statistics—-—
1944', in Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Industry,
Mining, Metallurgical and Chemical Branch, 1946; (5), Dominion
Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, Trade of Canada—
Calendar Year, 1927—1939; (6), Statistical Year-Book of the League
of Nations, 19393—33, p. 270, ibid., 1935—36, p. 242, ibid., 1941—1,2,
p. 196.
D Swedish income and consumption estimates
For 1896—1930 the estimates of national income and consumption
are from Erik Lindahi, Einar Dahigren, Karin Kock, National
Income of Sweden, 1861—1930 (Stockholm Economic Studies, No.
5A and B, 2 vol., Stockholm, 1937), Vol. 1, Table 49, col. 10,
and Table 57, col. 9. The estimates of national income for the years
before 1896 are not complete and therefore cannot be used for our
purposes. For 1930—34 the above source quotes (Vol. 1, Table 61)
the estimates of Dahigren in Produktionsstatistik uppskattming
av Sveriges Nationalinkomst aren 1930—1934, Statens offentliga
utredningar 1936: 18 (Stockholm, 1936). These estimates were
chained to the earlier estimates in 1930. Both the income and the
consumption series were deflated by the cost-of-living index
(Lindahi and others, op. cit., Vol. 1, Table 51) and divided by the
estimated number of consumption units, given up to 1930 by
Lindahi (Vol. 2, Table 64) and extrapolated by us to 1934 by
means of an index of population.
E The estimates of national income; aggregate profits, and cor-
porate profits are those reproduced in columns (4), (5), and (6).
To these series were added federal corporate income taxes as
given in Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1944—45, p. 277,
Table 291, column.7.COMMENT 441
Fz(4) +corporate income taxes (see reference E)
(8) X United States population
highest value of the index Zprecedingthe given year
Inasmuch as there is probably no way of computing a satis-
factory price index for the war years 1917—18, we took as the
•highest previous income for 1919 (Z.190) a simple average of
and Z'16.
GRate of change in wholesale prices
t_t—1
•Computed by means of the formula
• 1914—41, BLS Index of Wholesale Prices: 1909—13, F. C. Mills,
Economic Tendencies in the United States (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1932), App. III, p. 584 (annual indexes of
wholesale prices, all commodities). The 1909—13 series was chained
to the 1914—41 series in 1914.
u
(1)—(2)+ (6)(7)
(BLS cost-of-living index) x(U.S. population)
(1) + (6) —(7)
(BLS cost-of-living index) x(U.S. population)
• COMMENT
WASSILY LEONTIEF
I have read Modigliani's 'Fluctuations in the Saving-Income
Ratio' with great interest. It is an excellent piece of work. There









Deviations of Actual from Computed Per Capita Consumption
and of Actual from Computed Saving-Income Ratio
—.03
1920
Actual minus computed per capita consumption, Ce., computed from equation 111 3
The dash lines indicate the years in which the highest real income per capita was realized in
any year preceding /.
The differences between actual annual consumption figures and
theoretical consumption figures computed according to formula
III 3—if plotted as a time series—do not seem to represent random
deviations; on the contrary, contain (as can be seen from the
graph) a pronounced systematic wave. This wave, is present also
in the deviations'of actual saving ratios from those 'com-
puted on the basis 'of Modigliani's formula III 1.
Actual minus computed saving-income ratio, computed from equation 1111COMMENT 443
If the timing of these waves is compared with the position of
Modigliani's "highest years" on the one hand, and the
fluctuation of actual income (Ye), on the other, one begins to
suspect that consumption (Ce) and the saving-incomeratio
of a given year depend not only on current income (Ye)
and the highest previous income (Y10) but also on the incomes of
the immediately preceding years, Yt_i, Such an
tional term could be introduced in the theoretical formula in the
form of a weighted or unweighted moving average of income for
a certain number of preceding years.
I would even suggest testing a theoretical relation in which a
relatively long, say 5-year moving average, is used and the highest
previous income is entirely eliminated. Being in sympathy
with Modigliani's general approach, I hope that this hypothesis
will prove to be not less efficient a predictor than his formula con-
taining the asymmetric variableS
In conclusion, I would like again to state that Mr. Modigliani's
paper is a valuable contribution to the current discussion of statis-
tical consumption functions.
REPLY
I am greatly indebted to Professor Leontief for his highly sugges-
tive comment. There are certainly very good a priori reasons to
expect that consumption habits were influenced by the prevailing
income during several recent years; some experiments in the direc-
tion of Professor Leontief's suggestions were carried out in the
course of the preparation Of this manuscript—with not too satis-
factory results.
In view of the revisions of the Department of Commerce data,
no great significance can be attached to the characteristic shape
of the residuals to which Professor Leontief so acutely calls atten-
tion. For this reason, it is unfortunately not possible at present to
test his suggestion; with data available only since 1929 a five-year
moving average would leave us with oniy some seven years, a
period insufficient for testing a hypothesis involving three in-
dependent variables. We hope that material will soon be available
for a more satisfactory test.0